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The Sexual Assault of Intoxicated Women
Janine Benedet1

Introduction
“Candy is dandy. But Liquor is Quicker.”2
- Ogden Nash

Men have commonly used intoxicants as a way of increasing their sexual access to
women. They have been encouraged to do so by the popular belief that alcohol and drugs
increase sexual arousal, 3 and that women who drink and take drugs are promiscuous and sexually
available. While feminists have repeatedly argued against such stereotypes, they now do so in a
social context in which women, and young women in particular, are increasingly encouraged to
consume large quantities of alcohol as part of having a “good time.” At the same time that
women are being warned about “date rape drugs” being surreptitiously slipped into their drinks,
some women are taking these drugs recreationally. Young women are also encouraged to
behave in sexualized ways while drunk.
This article considers how the law of sexual assault in Canada deals with cases of women
who have been consuming intoxicants. In particular, it considers under what circumstances the
doctrines of incapacity and involuntariness have been applied to cases in which the complainant
was impaired by alcohol or drugs. It also reflects on problems of proof in such cases. Finally, it
examines whether the treatment of this class of complaints tells us anything about the law’s
understanding of consent, and capacity to consent, more generally, in the context of competing
social understandings of women’s use of alcohol and other drugs.
Women, Drinking and Drug-Taking
I wish I could drink like a lady,
I can take one or two at the most.
After three I'm under the table,
after four I'm under my host.
1
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- Dorothy Parker4

Before considering the legal treatment of the sexual assault of intoxicated women it is
useful to review the current trends in women’s consumption of alcohol or drugs. Those patterns
can then be placed in their social context of competing attitudes to women and drinking.
Research in Canada, the U.S. and the U.K. consistently confirms that “binge” drinking by young
women is a serious concern. Younger women are much more likely to drink five or more drinks
in a single sitting (a standard measurement of binge drinking) than older women. In England, a
2002 health survey showed that 23% of women aged 16-24 drank more than 21 drinks per week
and just over half reported drinking at least six drinks on their heaviest drinking day of the week.
A 2001 study by the Harvard School of Public Health indicated that 41% of college-aged women
engaging in binge drinking either occasionally or frequently. While these numbers had not
increased significantly since 1993, the study noted that a full 30% of women reported being
drunk at least three times in the past 30 days, while 42% reported that getting drunk was an
important goal of their drinking. 5 In Canada, a 2004 national survey indicated that binge
drinking rates were highest among women aged 18-19, of which 38.8% of women drinkers
reported drinking five or more drinks on a typical drinking day. 6 The figure for women 20-24
dropped to 21.6%.7 Another study of university-age students in British Columbia reported that
more than half of students had engaged in binge drinking in the past month and 15% did so
weekly.8 Given these statistics, and the high rates of sexual assault against younger women, this
article focuses in particular on younger women9.
Studies of alcohol use among young women show a relationship between alcohol and
sexual behaviour, although researchers seldom distinguished between unplanned sex and sexual
assault. The Harvard study reported that 21% of respondents (male and female) indicated that
they had unplanned sexual activities one or more times during the school year after they had
been drinking; 27% reported alcohol-related memory loss. 10 The study did not ask if the
respondents had experienced sexual assault connected to alcohol consumption. Another study of
patients at a Baltimore STD clinic showed that women who had engaged in binge drinking in the
4
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past 30 days were significantly more likely to engage in sexual activity that put them at risk for
disease, including anal sex. 11 They were also more likely to use other drugs such as heroin and
cocaine.12 The respondents were not asked if the sexual activity was consensual. The omission
of this question from many studies on intoxication and sexual behaviour is odd given that
researchers generally agree that drug and alcohol consumption is associated with an increase in
sexual violence.13
There is also evidence that young women are increasingly using drugs recreationally,
including “date rape” drugs such as GHB, rohypnol and ketamine, often in combination with
alcohol. 14 These drugs are often referred to, along with MDMA (ecstasy), as “club drugs”
because they are consumed at dance clubs and raves. Canada’s National Addiction Survey does
not measure the use of these drugs by women, but it appears generally accepted that their use has
increased in the past decade, along with other drug use.15
Canadian data on the incidence of sexual assault after use of alcohol and drugs is scarce,
particularly where their consumption is voluntary. One large U.S. study estimated that 3 million
American women have experienced drug-facilitated rape in their lifetime, or 200,000 in the past
year. 16 Another 3 million had been raped while incapacitated from voluntary consumption of
intoxicants (300,000 during the past year). These victims were even less likely to report their
rapes to law enforcement than other victims. 17 If the rate in Canada is similar, that would mean
that approximately 50,000 women each year are sexually assaulted while incapacitated by drugs
or alcohol, whether through voluntary or involuntary consumption.
All of this evidence indicates that significant numbers of young women render
11
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themselves voluntarily impaired and that this increases their vulnerability to sexual assault. Most
of these sexual assaults are never reported to police. This problem appears to be increasing
rather than diminishing.18
The contested social meaning of women’s drinking is not a new concern for feminists.
Constance Backhouse writes of the tensions in the 1920s between temperance feminists who
drew a clear link between alcohol use and the male mistreatment of women, and the “flappers”
who wanted women to be free to drink and to socialize with men without losing their standing in
the eyes of the community. 19 “Liberated women” of the decades between the world wars, with
Dorothy Parker a prime example, were well aware of the link between drinking and sexual
activity.
Like so many contexts in which women’s sexuality is constructed, the social meaning of
drinking and drug-taking continues to be contested and contradictory. Women have chafed at
social conventions that would limit them to sobriety and chastity, but run into stereotypes that
affect their credibility when they complain of sexual assault while drunk or high. Binge drinking
and especially the idea of keeping up with men “drink for drink”, are promoted today as a kind
of female empowerment for young women20, while women who complain of sexual assault
occurring while they were intoxicated still face social reactions that hold them partly or
completely to blame.
In a recent series of mock jury studies, Emily Finch and Vanessa Munro demonstrated
that among mock jurors in England, attitudes toward the credibility of rape complainants were
highly dependent on the degree of responsibility the jurors ascribed to the woman for her state of
intoxication.21 The attitude that a woman who gets extremely intoxicated in mixed company
opens herself up to a risk of sexual assault is one that is certainly present in this country as well,
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and may be heightened where the source of the intoxication is drugs rather than alcohol.22
Lise Gotell has written extensively of Canadian sexual assault law’s construction of
victimhood based on recognition of sexual risks and risk-averse behaviour. She argues that:
The prudent and responsibilized feminine sexual subject weaves through judicial
discourses of affirmative consent. Concepts of risk are deployed to construct and
demarcate revised boundaries of good and bad victimhood. While the idealized
masculine sexual citizen, constituted in and through an affirmative consent
standard, is he who rationally responds to the risks of criminalization through
consent seeking, the idealized feminine sexual subject is she who actively
manages her behaviour to avoid the ever-present risk of sexual violence.23
While “intoxicated complainants can be constructed as defying standards of sexual safekeeping
by placing themselves at risk,” Gotell also notes that the shift to an affirmative consent standard
in Canadian sexual assault law has led to increasing convictions in cases where complainants are
highly intoxicated or passed out.24
One recent case that supports Gotell’s thesis is R. v Saadatmandi.25 The complainant,
age 18, met one of the two accused in an internet chat room. A number of sexually charged
written exchanges occurred and the complainant agreed to meet with him. She lied to her
parents about where she was going and got into the accused’s car, even though another man was
with him. She drank from a bottle of juice given to her by the men even though it was already
open and there had been talk of them giving her drugs. The complainant became extremely
intoxicated and was sexually assaulted by both men in a condominium swimming pool and in the
basement of one of their homes. They dumped her in a public park without her purse, which
they threw on the road several blocks away.
The complainant lied to police and told them she had been abducted by strangers. When
her online messages were discovered, she admitted that she met the accused with the expectation
that she would have sex with him and that they might consume alcohol or drugs, but that she had
not consented to take the GHB later found in her system and had lacked the capacity to consent
when the sexual acts took place.
The trial judge convicted both men. The complainant’s credibility was buttressed by a
DVD the men had recorded of the sexual assault in the basement, which showed the complainant
to be nearly unconscious. The trial judge also made a finding that the complainant did not
voluntarily take the drugs that were dissolved in the juice, even though it was open to him to find
that she knew there was probably something added to the drink but drank it anyway. The trial
judge did express concern at the complainant’s behaviour, noting that:
J.M. freely communicated with a stranger who contacted her out of the blue on
22
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the internet. She flirted with him and foolishly agreed to meet, giving him her first
name, address and telephone number. She knew he had mentioned bringing
alcohol and drugs and she did contemplate the possibility of a sexual encounter
with him. When he showed up near her residence with his friend, she voluntarily
got into his car. It was my observation that J.M.’s continued attempts to minimize
her provocative and foolish behaviour stemmed from her intense embarrassment
that she allowed herself to get into the situation in the first place. 26
It is hard to deny that the complainant in this case made a series of decisions that
increased the likelihood that she would be sexually assaulted. While this may be important from
a practical perspective, from the view of the criminal law it should be irrelevant, as Justice Fisher
ultimately recognizes in this case. No behaviour by the woman, other than voluntary consent
itself, gives a man the green light to apply force of a sexual nature to her. Yet complainants who
rely on this legal truth to shield themselves from sexual violence, it would appear, are frequently
disappointed. Women who use GHB recreationally report awareness of the link between such
drugs and sexual assault, but tend to think they have taken sufficient precautionary measures to
avoid such assaults. 27
One can only speculate what the result in Saadatmandi might have been had the DVD not
been found. Certainly, it would have made the Crown’s case much more difficult, given the
complainant’s testimony that she had been open to drug taking and sexual activity with the
accused when she agreed to meet with him. The complainant’s lies to police show that she was
concerned that her claim of sexual assault in such circumstances would not be believed and that
she needed to present herself as the blameless victim of a kidnapping and stranger assault. Other
victims in similar circumstances may simply not report the crime at all.
Intoxication and Incapacity in Canadian Sexual Assault Law
Looking more broadly, then, how does the criminal law deal with cases of sexual assault
where the complainant is intoxicated? The common law of rape has always held that intercourse
with a woman who is asleep or unconscious amounts to rape. The rule applies to
unconsciousness from any source, including self-induced intoxication. 28
In Canada, the Criminal Code requires that the Crown prove non-consent as part of the
actus reus of the offence. While the Code does not refer to the relevance of the complainant’s
intoxication specifically, the 1992 amendments define consent as “the voluntary agreement of
the complainant” to engage in sexual activity. The Code also states that “no consent is obtained
where the complainant. . . is incapable of consenting. . . .”29 Taken together, these provisions
suggest that evidence of the effects of the consumption of alcohol and/or drugs may be relied on
26
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by the Crown to prove non-consent through a lack of capacity to consent to sexual activity or a
lack of voluntary agreement to engage in that activity.
Turning first to incapacity, there are numerous cases in which courts find a complainant
incapable of consent due to intoxication, but in almost all of these cases the complainant is also
asleep or unconscious when the sexual assault begins. Where the complainant is not
unconscious, but merely drunk or high, courts have struggled to articulate a threshold for
incapacity short of total non-responsiveness.
The Supreme Court of Canada considered this issue in R. v. Daigle30. There the 15 year
old complainant was drinking alcohol with her 20 year old half-brother and his friend. The men
slipped the hallucinogen PCP into her drink and she began to feel out of control and confused. 31
Eventually the two men engaged in sexual acts with her. The trial judge found that she was
“responsible for her own actions” and acquitted the accused. 32 The Quebec Court of Appeal
overturned this acquittal and substituted a conviction, holding that consent is not valid where the
complainant is so intoxicated that she is unable to control her actions. The Supreme Court of
Canada affirmed this decision in brief reasons.
The Court of Appeal quoted the words of Fish J.A. (as he then was) in R. v. St. Laurent:
As a matter both of language and of law, consent implies a reasonably informed
choice, freely exercised. No such choice has been exercised where a person
engages in a sexual activity as a result of fraud, force, fear, or violence. Nor is the
consent requirement satisfied if, because of his or her mental state, one of the
parties is incapable of understanding the sexual nature of the act, or of realizing
that he or she may choose to decline participation.
"Consent" is, thus, stripped of its defining characteristics when it is applied to the
submission, non-resistance, non-objection, or even the apparent agreement, of a
deceived, unconscious or compelled will. Putting the matter this way emphasizes
the difficulty of distinguishing, otherwise than by reference to vitiating factors,
between "consent" and "non-consent" in relation to the offence of assault.33
While Daigle confirms that incapacity to consent may be established at a point short of
unconsciousness, it also appears to rely on the fact that the complainant’s consumption of PCP
was involuntary and without her knowledge.34 Thus it is unclear to what extent this fraud on the
complainant was relevant to the outcome in the case. Would the same result have followed if
the complainant had voluntarily ingested the drugs?
A survey of recent decisions on incapacity and intoxication shows that judges are
30
31
32
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generally willing to find incapacity to consent in the face of voluntary intoxication only where
the complainant was unconscious or asleep during much of the sexual activity, and especially
where she was intoxicated or asleep when it commenced. 35
In several of these cases, the
accused was also the complainant’s employer, heightening his power and her vulnerability. 36 In
many others, the sexual assaults occurred at house parties where many people were present,
which can provide important corroboration of the degree of intoxication experienced by the
complainant.37
Courts are also willing to find incapacity even where the victims are not completely
unconscious where, as in Daigle, the intoxicants were not consumed voluntarily. For example,
in R. v. Bell, the accused was convicted of drugging the male and female complainant without
their knowledge, and then sexually assaulting them. The two complainants had voluntarily
consumed both ecstasy and alcohol, but they claimed that the accused gave them a spiked
drink.38 The trial judge found that their intoxication was not caused by excess alcohol but rather
by the drug administered by the accused. This fact seems to have been important to the judge’s
conclusion that the pair did not consent. In R. v. Byer, the accused was convicted of drugging
and raping four young women on separate occasions over the past 15 years. 39 The judge found
the women incapable of consenting even though they were conscious when the rapes occurred.
The degree to which the intoxication was voluntary should not affect the legal assessment
of incapacity. Voluntary intoxication is not the same as voluntary consent. If the complainant is
incapable of consent then there is no consent, and it does not matter how the incapacity came
about. As a practical matter, however, courts appear to be more generous in their assessment of
incapacity where the victim is tricked by the accused into consuming intoxicants unknowingly.
This suggests that courts are influenced by the “fault” of the complainant and are, at some level,
judging how blameless she is.
Overall, the cases in which courts are more likely to find incapacity due to intoxication
are those in which the complainant is either entirely incapacitated or has become intoxicated
through no fault of her own. Yet the vast majority of sexual assaults of intoxicated women occur
where the complainant has become voluntarily intoxicated and is not totally unconscious. In
such cases, courts have struggled to define a test or a threshold for incapacity.
35
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A leading case that rejects a claim of incapacity due to voluntary consumption of alcohol
and drugs is the 1996 decision of the Ontario Court of Appeal in R. v. Jensen.40 There the 15
year old complainant willingly consumed quantities of alcohol and drugs at the home of an older
man who was her drug supplier. She claimed that he sexually assaulted her while she was
impaired, but not unconscious. She testified to saying “no” to the accused. The trial judge
convicted on the basis that the complainant was either incapable of consent or had not consented.
The Ontario Court of Appeal, in a 2:1 decision, overturned this result, holding that the trial judge
had made inconsistent findings, because incapacity and non-consent were mutually exclusive.
The majority of the Court of Appeal found that the complainant’s level of intoxication had not
left her unconscious or unable to control her body, contrasting the facts before them with the
earlier case of R. v. Sarson where the complainant fell down and hit her head as a result of the
intoxication.41 In Jensen, the majority of the Court of Appeal defined capacity to consent as a
“minimal” state.42
This understanding of capacity as a minimal threshold is echoed in other jurisdictions. At
one point, trial judges in British Columbia appeared to be applying the same threshold for
incapacity to complainants as was applied to the accused who wanted to argue the common law
defence of extreme intoxication as a defence to a charge of sexual assault. 43 This defence
allowed the accused to prove on a balance of probabilities that he was so intoxicated as to lack
the minimal intent or voluntariness required for the sexual contact.
In R. v. L.C.,44 the complainant and the accused attended a house party where both
consumed alcohol. The complainant was observed by other guests to be intoxicated to the point
of being unable to speak. She testified that she had no memory of the sexual activity. The
accused said that while the complainant was drunk, she was not staggering or falling, and that
she led him to the bedroom and was seated straddling him at one point in the sexual activity.
L.C. was convicted and appealed. Relying on the Supreme Court of Canada’s decision in R. v.
Daviault,45 which created a defence of extreme intoxication akin to involuntariness, Justice
Rogers held that:
. . .because the evidence showed that Ms M. was not “passed out” i.e. asleep when
the sexual activity took place, in order for the learned trial judge to have reached
the conclusion that he did he had to have been satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt
that alcohol had rendered Ms. M. an automaton. That is to say: her mind was
disengaged from what her body was doing.46
The summary conviction appeal judge found that the Crown had failed to prove incapacity on
40
41
42
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44
45
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[2002] B.C.J. No. 2413 (S.C.) [L.C.].
[1994] 3 S.C.R. 63.
L.C., supra note 43 at para. 6.

this standard and that the accused’s evidence that the complainant had consented “by her
conduct” had not been rejected by the trial judge.47 He allowed the appeal and set aside the
conviction. The court took a similar approach in R. v. Mullaney, noting that while the
complainant was clearly intoxicated and unable to remember what happened, she was not
“insensate” and so had the capacity to consent.48
This test was considered by Justice Bennett of the same court in R. v. Siddiqui.49 In that
case the complainant was 17 years of age and struggling with problems at home. She went to an
apartment with a male friend and played cards with a group of young men, including the
accused, whom she had not met before. The complainant was drinking vodka, smoking
marijuana and also snorting the drug Ritalin. She decided to leave the apartment to make a
phone call and get food and more alcohol. The accused left around the same time and they
walked together toward the Skytrain station.
The complainant testified that she had only fragmented memories of what happened after
this point, but that she had rebuffed the accused’s advances. She recalled having been in a small
concrete area and having the accused tell her to get dressed, and of being on the Skytrain and
realizing that her undergarments were gone, her pants were inside out and her shirt was open.
Her underwear and sock were later found in an underground parkade.
The accused testified that the complainant looked like she was on drugs at the time she
arrived at the apartment. She drank around one half of a bottle of vodka and he had seen her
smoking pot and repeatedly inhaling crushed Ritalin, although she was not able to consume
much of it. As they walked toward the Skytrain she was stumbling and fell. He testified that all
of the sexual activity was at her initiation and that while she was stumbling and not focused he
could understand what she was saying.
Justice Bennett rejected the prior case law equating incapacity to automatism. This line
of cases confused the standard for an accused’s defence to a criminal charge with the standard to
be used for proof of the complainant’s incapacity to consent.50 Quoting Jensen, she defined
capacity as a state in which the complainant “was sufficiently aware that she was able to make
decisions and act upon them” and also quoted the definition of incapacity used in Daigle, as one
that asks whether the complainant was intoxicated to the point where she could not understand
the sexual nature of the act, its risks and consequences, or realize that she could choose to
decline to participate. On this standard, Justice Bennett found that the complainant clearly had
the capacity to consent. The evidence suggested that she was not so affected by the alcohol and
drugs that she lacked capacity.
Justice Bennett was correct to reject the analogy between the extreme intoxication
defence and incapacity to consent, because they are measuring two very different things. The
extreme intoxication defence was based on the idea that one might be so intoxicated as to lack
47
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the minimal intent to apply force and to be in a state of near-automatism. This can be also be
expressed as a lack of voluntariness with respect to the actus reus of that application of force.
Incapacity to consent measures what is a much more complex mental state, namely the ability to
make a voluntary choice to engage in sexual activity. A person with intellectual disabilities that
render her unable to understand the nature or consequences of sexual activity may lack the
capacity to consent, for example, but she is not an automaton.
Yet in light of the more generous test for incapacity adopted by the court, her conclusion
that the complainant did have capacity is puzzling and warrants further attention. The accused
himself testified that the complainant appeared not normal, that she was stumbling and falling,
mumbling her words and that she lacked focus. This hardly seems like a state in which a person
could give voluntary consent to sexual activity in a public place with a bare acquaintance. The
complainant testified that she could not remember the sexual activity but that she found the
accused unattractive and that she would not have wanted to have sex with him. The trial judge
held that this was not sufficient to prove non-consent at the time, given that alcohol was a
disinhibiter and might have affected her conduct. The trial judge’s reasons conclude with the
following:
I wish to add, that at the end of her testimony M.S. told me that she was not lying.
In acquitting Mr. Siddiqui I am not finding that M.S. lied. I conclude that M.S.
believes that she was sexually assaulted and that she did not consent. However,
on the whole of the evidence and for the reasons above, I cannot be satisfied
beyond a reasonable doubt that the Crown has proved lack of consent.51
In this passage, Justice Bennett appears to be finding that the complainant had a mistaken belief
in her own non-consent. Faced with the complainant’s incomplete memory, and given that even
the accused described the complainant as impaired and unfocused, it is worth asking how the
Crown could have ever proved a lack of capacity short of demonstrating that the complainant
was unconscious at the time the sexual activity took place. While Justice Bennett rejects the
“automaton” standard, it is not clear that she is applying a significantly more relaxed threshold.
For some judges, not even proof of complete incapacity is enough, as they leave open the
possibility of prior consent to future sexual activity while asleep or unconscious. The existence
of such a doctrine in Canadian criminal law was raised by the decisions of the Alberta courts in
R. v. Ashlee.52 In that case passers-by observed two men fondling the exposed breasts of an
unconscious woman on a public street. The woman was taken to hospital, but signed herself out
before making any police complaint and did not testify. The Crown’s case consisted of evidence
of other witnesses and the medical evidence of her extreme intoxication. The trial judge
convicted, but the summary conviction appeal judge allowed the appeal, holding that the Crown
had failed to negate the possibility that the woman had given consent before becoming
unconscious and had therefore failed to prove non-consent.
On appeal to the Alberta Court of Appeal the court, by a 2:1 majority, allowed the appeal
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and restored the conviction. Lise Gotell has described the majority reasons as “stunning” and a
“firm rejection of the defence of prior consent.”53 But we should not ignore the fact that 2 of the
5 judges who heard this case were prepared to allow a defence of prior consent, or more
particularly, to require the Crown to prove beyond a reasonable doubt in all cases where a
complainant is unconscious that she did not earlier give consent to being touched if and when she
lost consciousness. Madam Justice Conrad, dissenting in the Court of Appeal, supported this
conclusion by reference to women’s autonomy and sexual freedom. In language reminiscent of
those who have criticized the Canadian definition of consent as having a chilling effect on sexual
relations between men and women, she wrote:
Just as everyone has the right to be free from unwanted sexual activity, everyone
has the right to consent to sexual activity. An individual, while competent, can
grant permission to another to touch his or her body in a sexual way, including the
permission to touch while the individual is sleeping or unconscious. This
legislation is not aimed at controlling the consensual, sexual choices of competent
adults. This is an offence against the person - not the state. It is the Crown's
burden to prove the person did not want the sexual touching that occurred.54
It is remarkable that any judge would want to preserve the “right” of individuals to consent to
sexual touching while unconscious, at a time when they are entirely incapacitated and vulnerable
and when they are not participating in any way in the activity. Not only is this a rather grim
view of sexual activity, it also confuses the Crown’s necessary legal burden to prove non-consent
with a factual presumption that the complainant is consenting. If the Crown adduces no evidence
on the issue of non-consent, the accused must be acquitted, but that does not mean that the
complainant is presumed to have consented. There is simply no evidence on that point, and the
absence of evidence legally inures to the benefit of the accused. Non-consent ought to be judged
as of the time of the sexual activity and the majority was right to reject the concept of “advance
consent.”55
Taken as a whole, the case law on incapacity to consent due to intoxication is
contradictory and incomplete. In cases of involuntary intoxication, impaired judgment seems to
suffice to render the complainant incapable of consent. In cases of voluntary intoxication, courts
are not willing to be so generous and have been reluctant to apply a threshold other than nearunconsciousness. In one sense, this reluctance springs from a similar focus on “choice” to that
animating the dissent in Ashlee endorsing a doctrine of advance consent. Prioritizing women’s
choice or agency sounds like it promotes women’s sexual self-determination, but unconnected to
any analysis of sex inequality, it leaves women to stand or fall by their “choices”, including their
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choice to get drunk or high in the company of predatory and violent men. 56
Mistake of Fact in Cases of Intoxication
In most of the cases I reviewed, the accused does not deny having sexual contact with the
complainant. Such a denial would be implausible, because the accused is typically either
identified by the complainant when she comes to, or identified by bystanders. In a few cases the
accused is identified by DNA evidence recovered from the victim. Instead the accused typically
argues consent, mistaken belief in consent, or both.
Obviously, the claim of consent cannot operate where the complainant is found incapable
of consent. A mistake of fact argument, however, can be advanced where the accused argues
that he honestly believed both that the complainant did have the capacity to consent and that she
in fact consented. The accused can rarely claim a mistaken belief in the complainant’s complete
sobriety, but rather that he thought that she was not so intoxicated as to be incapable of giving
voluntary consent.
This point was confirmed by a majority of the Supreme Court of Canada in R. v. Esau.57
There the complainant and accused were at a house party; both were drinking. The complainant
testified that she awoke the next morning to find that she had been sexually assaulted. She
testified that she had no memory of what occurred, but that she would not have had voluntary
sexual relations with the accused because he was her second cousin. The accused testified that
the complainant invited him into the bedroom and was a capable and willing participant.
Defence counsel did not request an instruction on mistake of fact, asserting that it was a case of
consent or no consent. Esau was convicted, but the Yukon Territory Court of Appeal allowed his
appeal. On further appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada, the majority held, in reasons written
by Justice Major, that the trial judge had erred in failing to leave mistake of fact with the jury. 58
There was evidence on which a jury might have found that the complainant, though lacking the
capacity to consent, appeared to be consenting.
Justice McLachlin dissented.59 She noted that on the complainant’s evidence she either
lacked the capacity to consent or did not do so. The defence evidence was that the complainant
did consent. There was no air of reality to the defence of mistake. The majority had also failed
to apply the reasonable steps provision in s. 273.2(b) of the Code, which requires that the
accused have taken reasonable steps to ascertain the presence of consent before a claim of
mistake can be made.
The reasoning of the majority in Esau was echoed in the majority decision of the Ontario
Court of Appeal in R. v. Osvath, where the complainant also alleged that she was sexually
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assaulted while intoxicated and asleep on a sofa at a house party. 60 She awoke to find her pants
lowered and someone having intercourse with her from behind. When she realized it was not her
boyfriend and she was in a public space, she turned around and saw the accused. She then got up
and left the house. The trial judge convicted on the ground that Osvath had, at a minimum, been
willfully blind as to lack of consent.
Osvath appealed his conviction and a majority of the Court of Appeal allowed the appeal.
The majority, citing no cases, found an air of reality to the defence of mistake of fact. The
appellant did not know how much the complainant had drunk. It was possible that she awoke
thinking she was having intercourse with her boyfriend and that Osvath had believed the
complainant had consented. The trial judge had erred in finding willful blindness on the facts,
because:
[the trial judge] says nothing of the complainant’s alleged participation in the act.
If the trier of fact believed the complainant initiated the sexual activity, or even
participated in it, whether or not she realized what she was doing at the time, it
would be too onerous a test of wilful blindness to require an accused to stop the
activity and in effect say, “Wait a minute; do you know who I am?” after having
already obtained her consent.61
Justice Abella dissented, noting that it was evident from the trial judge’s findings he did not
believe that the accused had asked for the complainant’s consent and that his state of mind could
properly be characterized as willful blindness.
The majority in this case appears to find evidence of both mistaken belief in capacity and
mistaken belief in consent. In light of the finding that the complainant was in a deep sleep at a
party where everyone was drinking, and that she did not know the accused, these conclusions are
surprising. The Court of Appeal never considers what might amount to reasonable steps in these
circumstances. Of course Osvath precedes the Supreme Court of Canada’s 1999 decision in R .v.
Ewanchuk, in which the Court confirmed that for the defence of mistake to operate the accused
must honestly believe that the complainant have communicated a “yes” through words or
conduct before the sexual contact occurs and that the accused have taken reasonable steps to find
out if the complainant did want the sexual touching.
Osvath can be contrasted with the more recent Ontario Court of Appeal decision in R. v.
Cornejo, where Justice Abella (as she then was) writes for the unanimous court and overturns a
jury acquittal, ordering a new trial. 62 There the complainant was heavily intoxicated after an
office party. She returned home and went to sleep. She awoke to find the accused, a co-worker,
sexually penetrating her. The accused testified that he had telephoned the complainant to ask if
he could come over and she made an affirmative sound. He testified that when he kissed her she
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said “not on the mouth . . . because I don’t love you” and that her eyes remained closed, but that
she had lifted her hips when he removed her pants.63 The accused argued mistake of fact and the
jury acquitted.
In overturning this jury verdict, Justice Abella notes:
The facts do not provide an evidentiary foundation for the assertion that when Mr.
Cornejo commenced sexual activity with the complainant, he believed she was
consenting. After entering a person’s home, late at night without permission, an
individual cannot commence sexual activity with a person who has been drinking
and was asleep, and then rely on the mistake defence solely on the basis that at
one point late in the encounter, the woman moved her body. The trial judge failed
to make reference to any facts other than the movement of the complainant’s body
after the sexual activity had begun. In these circumstances, the movement of the
complainant’s pelvis was simply an insufficient basis to allow the defence to go
the jury.
These circumstances called for Mr. Cornejo to take reasonable steps to ascertain
consent, and as he took no steps, s. 273.2(b) statutorily bars the defence. 64
The appellate decision in Cornejo does not rely on the complainant’s lack of capacity due
to intoxication, but rather on a simple absence of consent. The Court of Appeal makes clear that
even where incapacity is not proved, the duty to take reasonable steps is heightened where the
complainant is known to be intoxicated.
Cornejo was distinguished, and the defence successful, in the 2008 case of R. v. Millar.65
There the complainant and her friend met the accused and his friend at a bar and the foursome
retired to the house of the complainant’s friend to continue drinking. The complainant had
consumed more than a pitcher of beer, a glass and a half of red wine, and two shots of tequila.
The tequila was purchased by the accused. The accused had consumed three or four pints of
beer, plus two or three shots. The complainant told her friend that she was feeling intoxicated
and unwell and went to sleep. Some time later she was joined by the accused, who initiated
sexual activity. The complainant later ran from the room in distress and attacked the accused
with a corkscrew.
The trial judge accepted the evidence that the complainant was incapable of consent and
that she had no interest in sexual activity with the accused when she went to bed. However, he
accepted the accused’s evidence that the complainant was awake and receptive until she objected
to intercourse, and that the accused’s actions satisfied the reasonable steps requirement because
they were gradual and progressive. He found that the accused was unaware of the degree of the
complainant’s intoxication, and distinguished Cornejo on the basis that the two had spent a
63
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friendly evening at the bar and she invited him to continue socializing.
The result in Millar was likely influenced by the complainant’s reluctance to testify and
her “contemptuous” demeanour in court. Nonetheless, it is troubling that a trial judge would be
so quick to conclude that the accused was unaware of the complainant’s intoxication, when they
had been drinking at the same bar for four hours, followed up by more drinking at home, and
when the complainant had gone to sleep alone with a garbage basket next to her head. He had
also been told that she had a boyfriend. The only explanation the judge can offer for why the
complainant later reacted with such anger is that she felt “guilty” about cheating on her
boyfriend, an explanation that calls on discredited stereotypes about women’s propensity to
make false complaints of sexual assault.
Thus while the application of the reasonable steps provision has restricted the application
of the defence of mistaken belief in cases involving intoxicated complainants, courts remain
willing to apply the defence. What amounts to reasonable steps to ascertain capacity is not clear,
especially in light of the courts’ unwillingness to demarcate a clear test for incapacity.
Problems of Proof
One of the greatest practical problems for prosecuting cases of sexual assault where the
victim is intoxicated is that the victim may have no memory of the assault. The presence of
sexual activity can be proven in some cases by physical evidence, and the identity of the
defendant through DNA analysis of that evidence. However, it remains difficult for the
prosecution to prove non-consent where the complainant is unable to testify as to what took
place. Sometimes non-consent can be proved through the testimony of bystanders. Many of
these cases take place at house parties where the sexual activity is observed or discovered by
other guests. This does not guarantee that such evidence will be found credible, however, since
many of these guests will have been intoxicated as well. 66
Some courts have been willing to assume that where the level of intoxication is so high
that the complainant has no memory of events, she must have been incapable of consent.67 The
majority of the Supreme Court of Canada rejected such an approach in R. v. Esau, where Justice
Major for the majority noted that the Crown could not discharge its burden of proving nonconsent with a complete absence of evidence on the part of the complainant as to what took
place, due to a lack of memory. 68 The majority held that the defence of mistaken belief in
consent should have been left with the jury, leaving it open to them to find that the complainant
was incapable of consent but appeared capable and consenting to the accused.
Justice
McLachlin in dissent noted the distinct disadvantage this poses for complainants, remarking that:
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Nor does lack of memory of what happened in the bedroom coupled with
drunkenness constitute [evidence of mistake of fact]. To say the complainant may
have appeared to consent because she has no memory of the events is simply to
speculate. It is, moreover, to speculate contrary to the evidence of both
complainant and respondent. The respondent describes a situation of capacity and
active participation, inconsistent with the ambiguous state where the complainant
does not have capacity or does not consent but nonetheless appears to. The
complainant says that she would have rejected the respondent because they were
related, again evidence inconsistent with an apparent but unreal consent. Thus the
assertion that the complainant’s drunkenness and lack of memory raise the
defence of honest but mistaken belief depends not on the evidence but on
speculation. It depends, moreover, on dangerous speculation, based on
stereotypical notions of how drunken, forgetful women are likely to behave. The
law as established by this Court in Pappajohn does not permit such speculation. It
demands specific evidence of a state of affairs which could give rise to an honest
misapprehension of consent when no consent existed. No such evidence was
presented in the case at bar.69
Some courts have overcome this obstacle by accepting evidence that the complainant
would not have consented to sexual activity with the defendant, so she must have been incapable
of consent on the occasion leading to the charge. For example, in R. v. J.R. the complainant
attended a party in a Toronto hotel room, where she became extremely intoxicated. She awoke
on the floor of the bathroom and realized that she had been sexually penetrated. Forensic
evidence indicated two men had sexual intercourse with her. The trial judge accepted her
evidence that she would not have had sexual activity that night with anyone because she had just
had an abortion and had received medical advice to abstain from intercourse for two weeks. He
also accepted her evidence that she would never have consented to sex with one of the two
defendants because she did not sleep with black men. 70 In other cases trial judges have accepted
similar evidence on the basis that the accused was too old; the complainant’s boss; not wellknown to the complainant; married; or a member of the same sex. 71 This kind of reasoning is
interesting because it resists the argument favoured in some cases that while the complainant
might have had these preferences or boundaries while sober, she would not have been so
discriminating while drunk or stoned.72
The Role of Pornography
It is worth paying attention to the role that pornography plays in these sexual assaults,
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and the way in which it can serve as evidence for the Crown. In a number of the cases I
reviewed, the accused made pornography of the victim by filming or photographing his sexual
assault. This pornography can come to light in different ways. In R. v. Niebergall, the accused
used his cell phone to photograph himself “tea-bagging” the unconscious intoxicated teenaged
complainant.73 He was reported to police by coworkers after he showed the photographs at
work.74 In Saadatmandi, discussed above, the two accused filmed themselves sexually
assaulting the teenaged complainant who was highly intoxicated on alcohol and drugs and
drifting in and out of consciousness. The DVD came to light when the accused turned it over to
police, arguing that it would prove that the complainant had consented. 75
These cases, while small in number, suggest a number of things about the relationship
between pornography and sexual assault that merit further and fuller consideration. First, they
indicate that pornography is sufficiently valuable to these men that they are willing to make an
evidentiary record of their behaviour. Second, they reveal the deliberate nature of these assaults.
It is reasonable to assume that the men in question will be sexually aroused in the future by
reliving their actions, not to mention socially validated by showing their conquests to others.
Third, cases where the men show the pornography to others suggest that the men may have a
mistaken belief in consent that is based on an incorrect understanding of consent in law (for
example a belief that in the absence of resistance, there is consent, or that voluntary intoxication
equals consent to sex). Or they may simply indicate a sense of invincibility and complete
indifference to the complainant as an autonomous person whose interest in the sexual activity
matters.76
The influence of pornography on sexual assault can be seen in other ways, even where
pornography is not made of the victim. In R. v. Wobbes, the complainant realized she had been
sexually assaulted while unconscious, when she awoke to find her public hair partially shaved
off. 77 According to bystanders, she had been sexually assaulted by more than one man, and
penetrated by a bottle as well as the accused’s penis. This kind of activity is commonly
presented in pornography and it is likely that the accused was mimicking actions he had viewed
there.78
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The pornography industry has worked to normalize the making of pornography of
intoxicated young women through products like the “Girls Gone Wild” video series. Jeff
Francis, the creator of the “Girls Gone Wild” franchise, has built a reported 100-million dollar
business out of presenting drunk young women engaging in sexual displays on film. 79 “Girls
Gone Wild” film crews troll beaches, bars, and parties looking for intoxicated young women.
The crew encourages the women they find to expose themselves and, sometimes, to engage in
sex acts on camera. The fact that the videos show “real” young women seems to be a major
selling point. “Real” young women are transformed into objects on display for male
consumption. Alcohol is a key ingredient in this transformation; the women agreeing to bare
their breasts and kiss their female friends in the videos always appear intoxicated. The message
being sent to male viewers seems to be that, given enough alcohol, any ordinary women can be
turned into pornography.
Through such videos, the pornography industry is appropriating assertions of freedom by
young women to manufacture a product. By convincing women that being naked and having sex
on camera is edgy, transgressive and liberating, the makers of these videos are using “female
empowerment” to sell a manufactured sexuality of male dominance. In her book Feminist
Chauvinist Pigs, Ariel Levy examines the way in which enthusiasm for “raunch culture” has
become a necessary trait for the modern liberated woman. 80 Levy writes: “GGW’s founder, Joe
Francis, has likened the flashing girls he captures on the videos to seventies feminists burning
their bras. His product, he says, is sexy for men, liberating for women, good for the goose, and
good for the gander”.81 However, Levy goes on to identify the problem with this perspective:
“Raunch culture is not essentially progressive, it is essentially commercial… [r]aunch culture
isn’t about opening our minds to the possibilities and mysteries of sexuality. It’s about endlessly
reiterating one particular – and particularly commercial – shorthand for sexiness.”82 The danger
is that it also conditions male sexual arousal to respond to the myth that women want to have sex
indiscriminately with any man, but just need to be loosened up first with alcohol.
A full treatment of the connections between intoxication, sexual assault and pornography
which point he videotaped himself sexually assaulting them).
79

Kenneth C.W. Kammeyer, A Hypersexual Society: Sexual Discourse, Erotica, and Pornography in
America Today (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008) at 154.
80
Ariel Levy, Feminist Chauvinist Pigs: Women and the Rise of Raunch Culture (New York: Free Press,
2005).
81
Ibid. at 12.
82
Ibid. at 29-30. For a different perspective on the relationship between raunch culture and feminism, see
Deborah Siegel, Sisterhood, Interrupted: From Radical Women to Grrls Gone Wild (New York: Palgrave
MacMillan, 2007). Unlike Levy, who seems to view women who embrace raunch culture as dupes, Siegel displays
more sympathy for young women who buy into the “new sexual bravado”. Siegel writes: “They are a generation
wedged between old definitions of feminism that no longer work and new ones that have been yet to be fully lived
out But it would be indeed a failure of feminism if younger women failed to recognize that the sexual arena is not
the only platform on which women must stage their feminist rebellion. And it will be a failure of feminism if
veteran feminists cannot find a way to understand that these very conversations are offshoots of their own”.

is beyond the scope of this article, and in many cases no one but the accused himself may know
about the pornography. In my view, however, the connections raise serious concerns worthy of
consideration in future research on sexual violence.
Intersecting Inequalities
While not all of the victims in these cases of intoxicated sexual assault are young, most of
them are adolescents and young women. This is not surprising, since in most of these cases the
intoxication is voluntary, and it is young women who are more likely to use drugs and binge
drink. In this way, age intersects with sex to produce a particular locus of vulnerability for
sexual assault. There are a number of cases in which accused men were acquitted of sexual
assault on girls as young as 12 on the basis of mistake of age and/or failure to prove nonconsent.83
The role of race and Aboriginal status in these cases is harder to capture. In many of the
cases, one can only guess the race of the parties based on the fact that the incident happened on a
reserve, or through other similar surrounding details. Others have detailed the repeated tendency
of the legal system to minimize sexual violence against Aboriginal women and girls. 84 In the
cases I reviewed, I did not see any identifiable differences in the law’s treatment of capacity to
consent on this basis, but there is certainly a lengthy and tragic history of the rape and sometimes
the murder of aboriginal women and girls by white men, typically after those men have given
them alcohol or drugs.
One example of this history is found in R. v. Jordan.85 Gilbert Jordan, known as the
“Boozing Barber”, had a pattern of picking up Aboriginal women in the poorest part of
Vancouver, taking them to a hotel room for sex, and then paying them to drink until they died of
alcohol poisoning. Between 1980 and 1987, Jordan was linked to the alcohol-related deaths of
six Aboriginal women. 86 In 1988, Jordan was convicted of manslaughter in relation to the death
of Vanessa Buckner (a white woman), who was found dead in the Niagara Hotel after drinking
with Jordan. 87 Jordan was sentenced to 15 years imprisonment, which was subsequently reduced
to 9 years by the British Columbia Court of Appeal. 88 A few years after his release, Jordan was
convicted of breaching a recognizance after luring an Aboriginal woman to his hotel room and
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attempting to pay her to drink.89
A more recent example is the sexual assault of a 12-year-old Aboriginal girl that took
place in Saskatchewan in 2001. Three adult men, Jeffrey Brown, Dean Edmonson, and Jeffrey
Kindrat, were accused of picking up the girl, giving her alcohol, and then taking turns having sex
with her. Edmonson was convicted at trial and given a two-year conditional sentence.90 Brown
and Kindrat were acquitted at trial, but their acquittals were overturned on appeal. 91 Kindrat was
acquitted again by the jury at his second trial, while Brown’s jury deadlocked and a mistrial was
declared. 92
While these cases fail to acknowledge a pattern of racist and misogynist sexual violence
against Aboriginal women, cases that pay attention to the role of race and culture also pose
problems. Supposed cultural norms may be used simultaneously to frame the harm to the victim
from the sexual assault and also to criticize her for her non-conforming behaviour in consuming
intoxicants. In R. v. Thurairajah,93 a fourteen year old girl was sexually assaulted by a 19 year
old acquaintance. She had gone drinking in a wooded area with a group of young people. She
became unconscious from intoxication and the accused raped her in a car and then dumped her
partly naked in a snow bank. He called the victim’s brother to pick her up, lied about why she
was there and tried to dissuade him from seeking medical attention for his sister. The victim was
eventually taken to hospital nearly comatose and suffering from hypothermia. Her cervix was
badly bruised.
In allowing a Crown appeal from the conditional sentence imposed at trial, Doherty J.A.
said for the court:
S.T. candidly acknowledges that she made some poor choices that day.
Like the respondent, [the victim] is of Tamil descent. In the Tamil culture, female
victims of sexual assault are sometimes stigmatized as unclean and unworthy of
marriage in the Tamil community. The respondent appreciated how this
community could react to the female victim of a sexual assault. [The victim] has
suffered some degree of stigmatization within her community. 94
The Court considered this risk of ostracism an aggravating factor in sentencing. While the Court
of Appeal could be commended for its sensitivity to the complainant’s place in her ethnic
community, it does nothing to repudiate these stereotypes as misogynist. Juxtaposed against the
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conclusion that she made “poor choices”, it comes closer to inadvertently endorsing them.
The Limits of Consent
Arguing incapacity as a result of intoxication raises a similar problem to what Isabel
Grant and I noted in the context of incapacity arguments where the complainant has a mental
disability. The focus on incapacity can obscure other evidence of non-consent, or of coercive
circumstances that should call consent into question, such as differences in age, physical size,
employment status, family authority or other factors.95 Thus when the court decides capacity is
present, intoxication as a factor falls away and is treated as no longer relevant. This is not
correct in law because even where the complainant has the capacity to consent, her intoxication
is still relevant to the voluntariness of that consent. For example, evidence of intoxication may
explain behaviour that appears contradictory to the complainant’s claim that she did not want the
sexual activity to take place.
The focus on incapacity also risks placing all the attention on the complainant and her
behaviour, and failing to focus on the actions of the accused. In many of these cases the accused
deliberately places himself in a particular position of trust with respect to the complainant, for
example by taking charge of escorting her home safely. Emphasizing precise measurements of
capacity risks ignoring the accused’s openly predatory behaviour.
Findings of non-consent and incapacity to consent should not be seen as mutually
exclusive if it is kept in mind that non-consent is a state of mind of the complainant, rather than
an active refusal to participate. Consent, on the other hand, is a voluntary agreement to
participate. There is a gap between these two definitions, in that a person may both be
competent to know that she does not want to participate in sexual activity and also lack the more
advanced capacity for truly voluntary agreement. Thus the court needs to consider whether any
agreement given by the complainant was voluntary, and not merely whether she knew she had
the right to refuse, before concluding that the complainant had the capacity to consent.96
The legal standard for incapacity appears to be both unarticulated and hard to reach.
While some courts speak of the inability to understand the consequences of the sexual activity
and to know one can decline to participate, in practice the standard appears to be one of near
unconsciousness. This of course creates problems of proof because women may not remember
what has happened when they are in an advanced state of intoxication. The scenario most
capable of proof is where the accused’s sexual activity rouses the complainant from
unconsciousness. Failing that, courts appear more generous in their assessment of incapacity
where the complainant has consumed the intoxicant involuntarily, even though this should be
irrelevant.
It may be that in cases where the complainant consumes the intoxicants unwillingly, the
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court is really considering her consent to be involuntary rather than lacking in capacity to
consent. The danger, of course, is that if involuntary intoxication is equated with involuntary
consent, voluntary intoxication will be equated with voluntary consent, endorsing the stereotype
that getting drunk or high is an invitation to sexual activity. If intoxication makes consent
involuntary, it should not matter whether the woman chose to get drunk or high.
Making a finding of incapacity in cases of intoxication is of less concern to the
complainant’s sexual agency than in the context of mental disability because intoxication is a
transient state. Thus a declaration of incapacity is not permanent for intoxicated women.
Relying on incapacity in this context also does not usually open the door to the introduction of
sexual history evidence in the same way as an incapacity inquiry in the context of a complainant
with a disability, which tends to focus on her past knowledge of sexual matters. There is
therefore little danger for complainants in expanding the definition of incapacity as it relates to
intoxication.
Presumably the objection to a broader category of incapacity rests on the question of
notice to the accused. In other words, can the accused be expected to know that the complainant
lacks capacity? More recent cases have limited the availability of the defence of mistake of fact
in cases of sexual assault where the complainant is intoxicated. Reasonable steps to ascertain
consent must take intoxication into account, and the accused must have an honest belief in
capacity as well as consent.
Sharon Cowan has argued that where the complainant is vomiting, stumbling or
incoherent, these are signs that the man needs to have a clear “yes” before proceeding.97
Canadian courts, with some notable exceptions, appear to be adopting a similar approach in the
context of mistaken belief claims, but are reluctant to conclude that evidence of this level of
intoxication is sufficient to prove consent is not voluntary. Rejection of mistake claims is not
helpful to women if the court will not find non-consent as part of the actus reus has been proven.
A standard of incapacity less extreme than near-unconsciousness is not unfair; little of
value is lost in a legal requirement that people desist from sexual activity until their visibly
intoxicated prospective partner sobers up. Placed in its social context, it is hard to see why we
would place a particularly high value on drunken or stoned sexual activity. One might take
Cowan’s point further and find that where the complainant is incoherent, ill or not fully in
control of her body, there is no capacity to consent and so even a clear “yes” is not valid. This is
no more unfair to accused persons than it was to change the law to make clear that silence or
passivity is not consent. At a minimum, we should be willing to apply the same test of
incapacity to voluntary intoxication that we do to involuntary intoxication.
But so long as the incapacity threshold remains high, courts need to consider how
intoxication affects the voluntariness of consent and the balance of power between the parties. In
most of these cases, the accused man is much less intoxicated than the complainant. Indeed,
advertising and social pressure for young women to keep up with men drink for drink ignore the
fact that women are usually smaller than men and that their bodies metabolize alcohol at
97

Sharon Cowan, “The Trouble with Drink: Intoxication (In)Capacity and the Evaporation of Consent to
Sex” (2008) 41 Akron L. Rev. 899 at 917.

different rates. Where there is a considerable disparity in the level of intoxication of the parties,
this augments the imbalance of power between them. The man has more power in a very real
physical sense, as well as through the subsequent evidentiary imbalance when he claims to
remember what happened and she does not.
The affirmative consent standard used in the Canadian criminal law of sexual assault is
an important advance, but it does not avert the danger that comes with judging the complainant’s
credibility. Our focus may be on what she wanted, but we still have to believe her when she
claims she didn’t want it. That becomes much harder when her own recollections are imperfect
and she follows new social conventions of heavy drinking and sexualized displays, conventions
that may be at odds with established attitudes about alcohol and sex.
A legal standard that permitted the Crown to prove coercion by the accused and to focus
on his predatory behaviour, as an alternative to proving non-consent, might better capture the
exploitation in such situations. In the absence of such a provision, courts could recognize that
intoxication may diminish the capacity of the complainant to consent even where it does not
eliminate that capacity entirely. In such cases, courts should be open to the conclusion that any
apparent consent was not voluntary and that the complainant did not, in her own mind, want the
sexual activity to take place. This approach would have the effect of shifting the focus of the
inquiry back to the accused and to the presence or absence of reasonable steps to ascertain
consent.

